

SECRET

7 December 1983

CONTRIBUTION TO THE DCI'S WORLDWIDE BRIEFING

Southern Africa

In southern Africa, our main concern this year, as in 1982, is with the growing violence and instability that provide further opportunities for the Soviets and their allies to the detriment of US interests.

Namibia/Angola. While we and our Western partners have made progress in negotiations for an independent Namibia, talks with the Angolans on the withdrawal of Cuban troops from Angola have not borne fruit. It is still far from clear whether Luanda is capable of negotiating a Cuban withdrawal, since the dominant faction within the regime depends upon Soviet and Cuban support. The Soviets, needless to say, do not want to relinquish their hold on Angola. It is our view that unless the Cuban issue is resolved, the South Africans will not agree to an internationally-sanctioned settlement of the Namibia problem.

In the absence of a settlement, the military struggle in northern Namibia and southern Angola has intensified.

-- South Africa aggressively patrols a buffer zone in southern Angola that it first established in August-September 1981 and enlarged in operations this past summer. SWAPO and Angolan forces have been pushed well to the north, and SWAPO guerrillas only rarely mount raids in northern Namibia.

25X1

SECRET

SECRET

- South African support to the insurgency being waged by Jonas Savimbi's National Union for the Total Independence of Angola (UNITA) probably has increased as well, since UNITA appears to have grown more active this year. The insurgents evidently have strengthened their hold on the southeastern portion of Angola and have increased their activity in other parts of the country, particularly in central Angola where UNITA's principal tribal support resides.
- Soviet and Cuban involvement appears to have deepened as well. The Soviets have recently increased their materiel support to the Angolan regime and Cuban troops are becoming more involved in the fighting against UNITA.

As long as these related problems remain unsolved, the potential for military escalation on all sides remains strong.

Mozambique/South Africa. Another worrisome development over the past year has been the growing turmoil in Mozambique where the Marxist regime of Samora Machel is threatened by the rapidly expanding insurgency of the National Resistance Movement (NRM), which is supported by South Africa. The Mozambicans have sought military aid from their neighbors and several non-Communist countries. If NRM activity continues to intensify, Machel might call for substantially more Communist aid including Cuban combat forces--a development which would greatly alarm South Africa. The struggle for power within Mozambique is affecting that country's other neighbors as well. The fighting has interrupted traffic on transportation routes vitally important to Zimbabwe and Malawi. The Mugabe government has sent troops to help protect a key pipeline in Mozambique that carries oil supplies to Zimbabwe.

SECRET

Zimbabwe. This past year has not been a particularly happy one for Zimbabwe and growing internal tensions threaten to undermine the gains made during Zimbabwe's first two years of independence. After large arms caches were discovered early last year, Prime Minister Mugabe ousted opposition leader Joshua Nkomo from the Cabinet, a move which triggered a growing wave of banditry and lawlessness by former members of Nkomo's guerrilla army. After dissidents kidnapped six tourists, including two Americans, and the sabotage of almost a quarter of Zimbabwe's air force, government security measures became increasingly repressive and arbitrary. Tensions have eased somewhat recently, but the underlying conflict between Mugabe and Nkomo, and their respective supporters, remains unresolved and could flare up with little notice.

South Africa. Over the longer term, the situation containing the greatest potential for instability is that in South Africa. Until there is significant racial reform within South Africa, anti-white insurgent groups will seek to overthrow white minority rule. The whites, on the other hand, are no less determined to maintain their control in the belief that black rule in Pretoria would exclude any future for white South Africans. While the South Africans are now in the process of granting limited political rights to Coloreds and Asians--a significant move by the Botha government that split the ruling National Party earlier this year--there is little prospect that this process will extend to black South Africans who now outnumber whites by a ratio of five to one.

SECRET

Since the fundamental racial conflict in South Africa appears unsolvable in the short run, we should expect continued regional instability which provides the Soviets and their allies with further opportunities for mischief-making. Pretoria aggressively moves against the black-led insurgencies, both inside South Africa and throughout the region. The principal South African opposition group, the African National Congress, already depends heavily on the Soviet Union for material support and training. The black southern Africa states, which are under increasing pressure from the South Africans, may come to feel they have little recourse but to turn to the Soviets for assistance--a move that ultimately will deepen regional conflict, not resolve it.

This briefing is classified SECRET in its entirety.

Sources:

1. S, FOR 4-82, OADR.
2. S, FOR 9-82, OADR.

SECRET